国际顶刊｜《世界政治》2023年第75卷第3期

01

期 刊 介 绍

World Politics（WP，《世界政治》）创刊于 1948 年，是一份国际知名的政治科学季刊，由约翰·霍普金斯大学出版社出版，在普林斯顿国际和地区研究所（PIIRS）的赞助下编辑制作。普林斯顿国际和地区研究所是普林斯顿大学关于世界文化和全球问题的研究、学习和对话中心。该刊接受国际关系、比较政治、政治理论、外交政策和现代化方面的分析和理论文章、评论文章和研究笔记，不发表严格意义上的历史材料、时事文章、政策文章或新闻性质的叙述。该刊在《科睿唯安 2022 年期刊引用报告》（Clarivate JCR2022）中JIF=5.0，在 187 种政治科学类（Political Science-SSCI）期刊中排名第 10（Q1），在 96 种国际关系类（International Relations-SSCI）期刊中排名第 4（Q1）。

02

期刊目录

1.Gender after Genocide: How Violence Shapes Long-Term Political Representation

种族灭绝后的性别问题：暴力如何塑造长期的政治代表性

2."This Rally is Not Authorized": Preventive Repression and Public Opinion in Electoral Autocracies

“这次集会未获批准”：选举型专制国家的预防性镇压与公众舆论

3.Reforming Global Governance: Power, Alliance, and Institutional Performance

改革全球治理：权力、联盟与制度绩效

4.Monopoly Politics: Price Competition, Learning, and the Evolution of Policy Regimes

垄断政治：价格竞争、学习以及政策制度的演变

03

摘要译文

01 种族灭绝后的性别问题：暴力如何塑造长期的政治代表性

【题目】

Gender after Genocide: How Violence Shapes Long-Term Political Representation

【作者】

Nikhar Gaikwad, Erin Lin, Noah Zucker

【摘要】

暴力对妇女政治代表性有何影响？本文研究了20世纪一场“分水岭冲突”带来的长期影响：红色高棉种族灭绝，柬埔寨约50%-70%的适龄男性在这场大屠杀中被害。作者利用有关大屠杀以及柬埔寨乡镇经济和政治状况的原始数据，发现种族屠杀与女性经济地位的提高以及女性在地方民选机构中的代表性的指标呈正相关。作者对经历种族灭绝的幸存者进行深入的民族志研究，以探索暴力促使女性担任民选职务的机制。研究发现了一个关键问题：在遭受种族灭绝最为严重的地区，寡妇反而获得了经济自主权，这为传统家庭中与幸存男性居住的女性提供了一个提高经济地位的经验。性别分工规范的转变以及其通过族群内部或代际途径的传播，使妇女能够在长期遭受种族灭绝暴力的社区中扮演更为重要的公共角色。

What are the legacies of violence on women’s political representation? This article examines the long-term effects of a watershed conflict of the twentieth century: the Khmer Rouge genocide, during which 50–70 percent of Cambodia’s working-age men were killed. Using original data on mass killings and economic and political conditions in Cambodian communes, the authors find that genocide exposure is positively associated with women’s economic advancement and current-day indicators of women’s representation in local-level elected office. The authors conduct in-depth, ethnographic interviews with genocide survivors to explore the mechanisms by which violence spurred women into elected office. A crucial finding emerges: In areas that suffered the genocide’s worst killings, widows obtained economic autonomy, providing a template for the economic advancement of women in traditional households with surviving men. The shift in norms regarding the sexual division of labor and its transmission through intracommunal and intergenerational pathways allowed women to adopt larger public roles over time in communities more exposed to genocide violence.

02 “这次集会未获批准”：选举型专制国家的预防性镇压与公众舆论

【题目】

"This Rally is Not Authorized": Preventive Repression and Public Opinion in Electoral Autocracies

【作者】

Katerina Tertytchnaya

【摘要】

预防性镇压会抑制还是会加强民众对不顾阻挠提出异议的团体的支持？尽管大量文献承认预防性镇压对专制稳定的重要性，但其对民意影响的研究匮乏。为了在这个问题上取得进展，本文从俄罗斯国内数据（包括未经授权的和已授权的抗议活动）和一项原创调查实验中提取了证据。作者指出，当局进行预防性镇压（如拒绝批准抗议活动）时，抗议者获得支持的能力就会受到影响。预防性镇压还限制了非暴力示威者策略对公众舆论的影响。然而，这些影响取决于公民对法律和当局的态度。本文的发现首次对预防性镇压的大众舆论效应进行了因果检验，深化了我们对镇压的后果和受众的理解，并对威权韧性方面的相关研究提供了启示。

Does preventive repression dampen or does it bolster mass support for groups that dissent despite obstruction? Although a large literature recognizes the importance of preventive repression for authoritarian stability, we know very little about its effects on public opinion. To gain traction on this question, this article draws on evidence from unusually detailed data on unauthorized and authorized protests from Russia and an original survey experiment. The author shows that when authorities engage in preventive repression, such as when they deny protest authorizations, protesters’ ability to generate support is compromised. Preventive repression also conditions the effect of nonviolent demonstrator tactics on public opinion. These effects, however, are contingent on citizens’ attitudes about the law and the authorities. This article’s findings—which provide one of the first causal tests of the mass opinion effects of preventive repression—expand our understanding of the consequences and audiences of repression and have implications for studies of authoritarian resilience.

03改革全球治理：权力、联盟与制度绩效

【题目】

Reforming Global Governance: Power, Alliance, and Institutional Performance

【作者】

Allison Carnegie, Richard Clark

【摘要】

大量文献分析了国际组织变革的决定性因素，重点关注系统性政治和经济冲击的作用。然而，这篇文章在更长的平常时期也考虑到了这个问题，探究与全球治理相关的国际组织何时改革以及哪些国家从这些改革中受益。作者认为，国际组织主要的利益攸关方的盟友比不结盟国家受益更多，但作者也记录了改革有时包含了对不结盟国家的让步。本文由此得出一个结论，即国际组织在平常时期会有益于利益攸关方的盟友，而在国际组织表现不佳时，他们会向不结盟国家提供优惠，以防止这些国家脱离国际组织。文章分析了从1944年至2018年间世界银行改革的原始数据集，并结合定性研究，发现其假设得到了支持。这些发现有助于解释国际组织内部令人费解的权力转移情况。

A large literature analyzes the determinants of change in international institutions, focusing on the role of systemic political and economic shocks. However, this article considers this question also in more business-as-usual periods, asking when institutions of global governance reform and which states benefit from these changes. The authors argue that allies of international organizations (io)s’ leading stakeholders benefit more than nonaligned countries; however, the authors also document that reforms sometimes contain concessions to nonallied members. This article theorizes that while io officials reward major stakeholders’ allies in normal times, they provide concessions to nonallies during periods of poor io performance to prevent these states from disengaging. Analyzing an original data set of reforms at the World Bank between 1944 and 2018, paired with qualitative evidence, the article finds significant support for its hypotheses. The findings help to make sense of otherwise puzzling instances of power shifts within ios.

04 垄断政治：价格竞争、学习以及政策制度的演变

【题目】

Monopoly Politics: Price Competition, Learning, and the Evolution of Policy Regimes

【作者】

Erik Peinert

【摘要】

从长远来看，先进工业国家的经济政策历来在支持价格竞争和支持国内企业的市场权力之间交替，设计反垄断、知识产权和贸易等不同领域。本文基于经济成本累积和国家内部人员流动的相互作用，提出了一种长期政策变化理论，解释了20世纪的多次政策交替。价格竞争或者市场权力的政策机制会产生效益递减效应，表现为竞争或市场权力内在的意外经济成本。然而，某种政策体制之所以能够持续存在，是因为政府官员中的既有骨干仍然坚持现有的政策方法。即使效益递减效应变得十分明显，也只有在这些既定政策制定者被撤职或规避之后，通过人员流动以及未作政策承诺的官员学习的方式，一项政策才会最终改变方式。文章通过美国和法国政府档案中的大量实证证据来支持这一论点。

In the long run, economic policy in advanced industrial states has historically alternated between favoring price competition and favoring the market power of domestic firms, across such disparate areas as antitrust, intellectual property, and trade. This article presents a theory of long-term policy change, based on the interaction of accumulating economic costs and staff turnover within the state, explaining multiple policy alternations during the twentieth century. Policy regimes of competition or market power endogenously generate diminishing returns, manifested as unintended economic costs intrinsic to competition or market power. And yet policy regimes endure because established cadres of government officials remain committed to existing policy approaches. Even as diminishing returns become apparent, it is only after the removal or circumvention of these established policymakers, through staff turnover and learning by uncommitted officials, that policy eventually changes course. The article supports this argument with extensive evidence from government archives in the United States and France.

翻  译：任好为

校  对：郭见田

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编辑：孙则尧

一审：聂凯巍

二审：大    兰

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